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We propose a quantum-like description of markets and economics. The approach has roots in
the recently developed quantum game theory.
INTRODUCTION
One of the biggest scientiﬁc revolutions was caused by
the emergence of quantum physics and the consequent
falsiﬁcationof the idea of the possibility of distin ction
between observer and observed phenomenon. Quantum
Zeno eﬀect is the most famous case in point [1]. This fact
is often used (without any reference to quantum theory)
by social scientists to argue that their theories are
beyond mathematical description. Here we would like to
propose a quantum-like approach to economics whose
usefulness, we think, can be veriﬁed only by further
investigation. The approach has roots in the recently
developed quantum game theory [2]. For simplicity and
clearness of the exposition, we shall suppose that there
are only two assets on the market. The ﬁrst one, denoted
by
$, fulﬁlls the role of money and its unit is 1
$.T h e
second one, denoted by




$. We shall also suppose that both assets





N being the natural numbers. The











k monetary units will
be engaged in market transactions. A player can be
present on the market in the shape of several traders
what allows him to engage various parts his capital in
diﬀerent ways. The opposite situation is also possible:
several traders canform a coalition . Such a clique
canbe described as correlated strategies of diﬀeren t
traders. The actual participationof the
k-th trader inthe














g coming from all traders.
The role of the arbiter
A is performed by anappropriate
clearinghouse who acts in a fully deterministic way
according to rules that are established by the law or/and
tradition. The arbiter
A canbe iden tiﬁed with the
algorithm used for clearing. Market transactions, that is
capital ﬂows, are settled according to the strategies put




k and the algorithm
A.I n
this way a commonprice
c is set for all tran sactionina
given turn. If one considers several markets connected
by traders strategies then simultaneous transaction with
diﬀerent prices are possible (e.g. arbitrage is possible).
Note that the trader is not obliged to know the market
rules but such knowledge is necessary if he or she wants
to act ina ration al way.
THE QUANTUM MODEL OF MARKET


















denotes the logarithm of the price at which the
k-th
player canbuy





























describes the situationof a player who is supplyin g the
asset






be regarded as demanding






units and both deﬁnitions are equivalent. Note that we
have deﬁned
q and
p so that they do not depend on
possible choices of the units for
G and
$. For simplic-












k belong to Hilbert spaces
H













k is a vector inthe direct sum of Hilbert




k. We will deﬁne canonically




k for each Hilbert space
H
k analogously to their phys-
ical counterparts position and momentum. This can be
justiﬁed inthe followin g way. Let
e
￿
p be a deﬁnite price,
where
p is a proper value of the operator
P
k. Therefore,









then it is pointless to put forward any opposite oﬀer for
the same transaction. The capital ﬂows resulting from an2
ensemble of simultaneous transactions correspond to the
physical process of measurement. A transaction consists





















































j is the projec-
tive operator givenby the division
￿ of the set of traders
f
k













g,t h a t










inthe roun d of tran sactioninquestion . The role of the
algorithm
A is to determine the division of the market
￿,









g and the values of
































k is willing to buy the asset
G at the transaction price





























gives the probability of selling






c or greater. These probabilities are infact
conditional because they describe the situation after the
the division
￿ is completed.
MAXIMIZATION OF THE CAPITAL TURNOVER
Every game is speciﬁed by its rules so to illustrate the
actionof the algorithm
A let us consider an example of
deterministic clearinghouse algorithm. Suppose that the
clearinghouse maximize the capital turnover at a uniform
price
























corresponds to entanglement in quantum theory. On the
market where transaction are made between two traders,
the above condition may be fulﬁlled only for every pair
of traders separately. Let us for simplicity limit the class













k) are functions of the variable
q (
p)w i t hc o m p a c t
supports and square-integrable. After ﬁxing the division
￿ we can rescale the amplitudes of supply and demand














































































measure the appropriate capital ﬂows. For a transaction
at the price
c, the maximal capital ﬂow is the lowest num-





















































































































There is at least one solution of the Eq. (7) because the
functions are continuous. If there are more solutions we







































































































































possessed by the traders after clearing the round of trans-
actions. The Eq. (7) guarantees that the capital changes
will be balanced, so the described game belongs to spe-
cially interesting zero sum class of game that do not gen-
erate capital surplus nor demand capital inﬂow (we ne-
glect such cost as brokerage etc). Maximizationof the
G
turnover results in diﬀerent price
c
￿ and capital ﬂows.
This asymmetry canbe removed by separate n ormal-
izationof the strategies inEq. (5) that is by replacin g





















s ,[ 4]a ndp e r -
forming calculations for probabilities instead of capital
ﬂows. Inthis case the assumptionof compactn ess of the
supports is superﬂuous. Deutsch arguments [4]c a nb er e -
peated here to show that the stochastic interpretation of
the presented model is not necessary. Note that the asym-
metry justiﬁes presentation of the supply and demand
curves in terms of probabilities and not capital ﬂows [3].
Another, more quantum, algorithm can be deﬁned if the
transactions are made with weights analogous to Eq. (6)
for all possible divisions
￿ and prices
c.S u c ht r a ns a c t i o ns
should be balanced for not realized bids. This algorithm
may exclude some trades from round of transactions. The
transaction operator would resemble the commonly use























































MARKET AS A MEASURING APPARATUS
Whena game allows a great n umber of players init




k against the Rest of the World (RW). (The player
RW has a lot incommonwith a macroscopic measurin g
apparatus.) The concrete algorithm
A may allow for an
eﬀective strategy of RW (for a suﬃciently large number
of players the single player strategy should not inﬂuence
on the form of the RW strategy). If one considers the
RW strategy it make sense to declare its simultaneous
demand and supply states because for one player RW is
a buyer and for another it is a seller. To describe such


















































































































E is the dimen-
sionless economical counterpart of the Planck constant.
Recall that this measure is not positive deﬁnite except for
the stated bellow cases. Inthe gen eral case the pseudo-
probability density of RW is a countable linear combi-




























1 . According to Eq. (3) and (4) (see also












































































(RW bids buying at
e




interpreted as the dominant supply and demand curves in
Cournot convention, respectively [3]. Note, that due to the





s may not be
monotonic functions. Textbooks on economics give ex-
amples of such departures from the low of supply (work
supply) and low of demand (Giﬀen assets) [6]. We will call
an arbitrage algorithm resulting in non positive deﬁnite
probability densities ag i ﬀ e n .
QUANTUM ZENO EFFECT
If the market continuously measures the same strat-





i, and the process
is repeated suﬃciently often for the whole market, then
the prices givenby the algorithm






i o ft h ep l a y e r .T h ene c e s -
sary condition for determining the proﬁt of the game is





i [3]. If, si-
multaneously, many of the players changes their strate-
gies thenthe quotationprocess may collapse due to the
lack of opposite moves. Inthis way the quan tum Zen o
eﬀects explains stock exchange crashes. Eﬀects of this












other example of the quantum market Zeno eﬀect is the




























2) have the natural interpre-
tationas the will of the





k) of the asset



















) means that in the case of classi-









a and the will of buying at any price equal
or above
e




g the player declares the will of selling at any price.
The above interpretation is consistent with the Heisen-

























i) do not correspond to the RW be-







0,i fa l w a y sf u l -
ﬁlled, allow for unlimited proﬁts (the readiness to buy
or sell
G at any price). The demand Eq. (10) and supply
Eq. (11) functions give probabilities of coming oﬀ trans-




















i and RW, proposing the price, use
the strategy














i ina two-player game
whenRW use the strategy with squared module of the
amplitude equal to normal distribution [3]. The maximal
intensity of the proﬁt [3] is equal to 0.27603 times the



















i has the same properties. In
such games a=0.27603 is a global ﬁxed point of the proﬁt
intensity function. This may explain the universality of
markets on which a single client facing the bid makes up
his/hers min d. Does it meanthat such commonphen om-
ena have quantal nature? The Gaussian strategy of RW






below). Any decrease in proﬁts is only possible by reduc-
ing the variance of RW (i.e. cooling). Market competition
is the mechanism responsible for risk ﬂow that allows the
market to attain the thermodynamical balance. A warmer
market inﬂuences destructively on the cooler traders and
they diminish the uncertainty of market prices.4
ADIABATIC STRATEGIES
Financial mathematics teach us that the ﬁrst moments
of the random variables
p and
q measure the expected
proﬁt from one transaction and the second moments mea-


































































































￿ ,a ndc a l li t the risk inclination operator,c f
Ref. [3].
￿ denotes the characteristic time of transaction




measures the risk asymmetry between buying and sell-
ing positions. Analogies with quantum harmonic oscilla-
tor allow for the following characterization of quantum
market games. The constant
h
E describes the minimal
inclination of the player to risk. It is equal to the product










￿.N o t et h a t
2
￿ is the minimal interval during which it makes sense to






















i are giﬀens [5].
Future investigations may reveal the situations foe which
the existence of giﬀens lead to optimal strategies.
It should be noted here that in a general case the
operators
Q
k do not commute because traders observe
moves of other players and often act accordingly. One
big bid can inﬂuence the market at least in a limited
time spread. Therefore it is natural to consider noncom-




















The analysis of harmonic oscillator in more then one





















). This has the natural interpretation
that moves performed by other players candimin ish or
increase one’s inclination to taking risk.
CORRELATED COHERENT STRATEGIES
We will deﬁne correlated coherent strategies as the















































In these strategies buying and selling transactions are















and is minimal. The annihilation operators
C
k and

















r. This leads to following form of









































































They are not giﬀens. It can be shown, following Hudson
[12], that they form the set of all pure strategies with
positive deﬁnite Wigner functions. Therefore pure








g by gaussiandistribution s.
MIXED STATES AND THERMAL STRATEGIES
According to classics of game theory [13] the biggest






). Among them the most interesting are the ther-
















t and maximal entropy. The
Wigner measure for the
n-th exited state of harmonic























































n-th Laguerre polynomial. The
mixed state
￿










































































































So it is a two dimensional normal distribution. It easy to
























is the generating function for the Laguerre polynomials.
It seems to us that the above distributions should de-
termine the shape of the supply and demand curves for
equilibrium markets. There is no giﬀens on such markets.
It would be interesting to investigate the temperatures of
equilibrium markets. Incon trast to the traders temper-
atures [7] which are Legendre coeﬃcients and measure
”trader’s qualities” market temperatures are related to
risk and are positive. The Feynman path integrals may
be applied to the Hamiltonian Eq. (12) to obtain equilib-
rium quantum Bachelier model of diﬀusion of the loga-
rithm of prices of shares that canbe completed by the
Black-Scholes formula for pricing European options [14].
MARKET CLEARED BY QUANTUM COMPUTER
Whenthe algorithm
A calculating in a separable
Hilbert space
H
k does not know the players strategies
it must choose the basis inanarbitrary way. This may
result in arbitrary long representations of the ampli-
tudes of strategies. Therefore the algorithm
A should be5
looked for in the NP (non-polynomial) class and quan-
tum markets may be formed provided the quatum com-
putationtechn ology is possible. Is the quan tum arbitrage




E? Penrose ideas concerning the thinking
process suggest searching for new physical phenomena
(e.g. giﬀens) on markets, where now the clearing algo-
rithms
A are constructed in a non-computational way
[15]. Was the hypothetical evidence given by Robert Gif-
feninthe British Parliamen t [ 16] the ﬁrst ever description
of quantum phenomenon? The market exchange mecha-
nism has inspired the so called transactional interpreta-
tionof quan tum mechan ics [ 17]. The commonly accepted
universality of quantum theory should encourage physi-
cist inlookin g for traces quan tum world insocial phe-
nomena.
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